Wisdom and Purpose

RICHARD JUSTIN McCARTY


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AN ESSAY

in

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

RELATIONS

of

WISDOM and PURPOSE

By

RICHARD JUSTIN McCARTY

1922

PRESS OF JOS. D. HAVENS CO.

TO
THE ROTARIANS.

In appreciation of their faith in the Wisdom of persistent and co-operative effort, action and service in promotion of the general welfare of mankind.

ARGUMENT.

The nature and practical significance of purposes and the means and methods used in their prosecution and achievement constitute the only available criterion of Wisdom.

Kansas City, Missouri,
March 12, 1922.

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CHAPTER I

THE PURPOSES OF MAN.

A Purpose, according to recognized authorities is:

> An idea or ideal kept before the mind as an end or aim of effort or action.

According to these same authorities a purpose may also be regarded as:

> A resolution to attain to an end or aim.

While these definitions apparently relate to different things they really represent different aspects of the same thing because an end or aim must involve a resolution and a resolution always involves an end or aim.

For this reason either definition is acceptable under certain conditions and according to the point of view.

In this treatise, however, the term **Purpose** is used in the comprehensive sense expressed by the proposition that:

> A purpose is determined in the mind whenever a resolution is made to attain to an end or aim.

Since attainment to an end or aim requires action and since action can be recognized only through its effect every end or aim may be regarded as the final effect of intended action.

Therefore, the significance of the term **Purpose** as used in this treatise may be more explicitly stated by means of the proposition:

> Whenever a man resolves to bring about or cause to be brought about any mental or physical effect there is determined in the mind of that man what is known as a purpose.

DETERMINATION OF A PURPOSE.

The determination of a purpose in the mind consists of reaching a conception of the final intended effect and of forming a resolution to produce it or to cause it to be produced. The conception may be definite, as in the case of a proposed building for which plans and specifications have been prepared; or it may be indefinite as, for instance, when it relates exclusively to the acquisition of knowledge or when a person tries to escape from some disagreeable or dangerous situation without regard to any other consequences of his or her action. But in every case there must be some kind of a conception in order that a resolution may be possible.

The resolution to produce the final intended effect must be such as to insure action, for otherwise there would exist in the mind

nothing more than a vague inclination which might be entirely without practical significance. Also, the resolution must insure immediate action because if not then it might be merely an intention and be subsequently abandoned, making it equivalent to an inclination.

Again, the resolution must insure persistent although not necessarily continuous action towards the intended effect for otherwise it might be given up after action had been taken and solely because that action had been based not on a resolution but on an inclination. On the other hand every resolution, howsoever complete, must yield when it becomes known that the intended effect cannot be produced. Thus, abandonment of effort or action does not always indicate a want of original resolution.

RESOLUTION AND OBJECT.

Therefore, it would seem that the only acceptable evidence of a resolution is persistent effort or action in the direction of the intended effect until all the operations shall have been completed and the final result determined.

The object of a purpose is the final intended effect. Experience shows that in the end it often does not correspond to the original conception upon which the resolution may have been based. Sometimes this is because the original conception had not been exact and sometimes it is because the precise effect was not found to be practicable.

Accomplishment of the object is the production of the final intended effect or its practical equivalent. Unintentional production of an effect considered in relation to the mind of

the person by whom it was produced is not equivalent to accomplishment of an object because in such a case there would be no resolution and, therefore, no purpose. Experience shows that accomplishment of an object usually begins after the formation of the purpose in the mind but that in many cases certain work necessary for the determination of the purpose may be used in the accomplishment of the object; as, for instance, surveys, plans and specifications made with a view to ascertaining whether a railroad or other structure shall be built.

As is well known, the accomplishment of the object need not always be prosecuted or completed by the person with whom the purpose may have originated.

The achievement of a purpose consists of

the performance of all mental and physical operations necessary to determine the purpose in the mind and to accomplish the object.

Since certain purposes may be determined in the mind of one person and their objects accomplished by others, achievement of a purpose may be regarded as consisting of two distinct although closely related operations.

Experience proves that the achievement of a purpose often requires the production of several subordinate effects and that each of these effects is or may be regarded as the object of a subordinate purpose.

Also, experience shows that, as a rule, subordinate purposes may be achieved by different persons co-operating in such a manner as to bring about the final intended effect of the general purpose with much more expedi-

tion and efficiency than would otherwise be possible. This means, of course, that the general purpose is, in effect, a combination of all those which may be subordinate to it.

Too much emphasis cannot be given to the importance of the condition here involved because, without it, all purposes of great and enduring benefit which require co-operation of a number of men would be impracticable; also, because although the condition is generally well-known its importance in practice is often far from being fully appreciated.

A definite purpose is one that has a clearly defined object which is known to be practicable and is certain to be accomplished.

An indefinite purpose either has an indefinite object or is determined in the mind without knowledge that the object is practicable.

DEFINITE PURPOSES.

To be able to achieve a definite purpose it is evident that a man must have decision of character, clearness of conception, foreknowledge of future conditions and ability to acquire, adapt and apply suitable means with precision as against every influence which might otherwise defeat the purpose.

Now, there are many men of great decision; some are so from ignorance, some are regarded as eccentric and others are recognized as men of common sense, talent or genius, each according to his achievements and to the mental attitude of those who may indulge their propensity to judge. But decision does not insure achievement for, in addition to restrictions of environment, every man wants foreknowledge and lacks precision, so that his best results are generally mere approximations.

Therefore, every human purpose may be regarded as more or less indefinite.

The purposes of man may be classified generally with respect to their objects as theoretical and practical.

Theoretical purposes are those which have for their objects the acquisition, promulgation and inculcation of knowledge without definite regard to its immediate practical application.

A theoretical purpose may be speculative, mathematical or experimental.

A speculative purpose is one that is confined to study, thought and instruction concerning the phenomena of the intellect and its relations to cause and effect.

A mathematical purpose relates exclusively to knowledge of fact and truth concern-

ing the relations of magnitude and quantity.

An experimental purpose is one that relates to the development of fact and truth by experiment and may have for its object either the discovery of the cause or causes which, under certain conditions, may be required to produce a certain effect or the ascertainment of the effect which a certain cause or certain causes, when placed under given conditions, may be depended upon to produce.

Now, the practical importance of a discovery that certain causes placed under certain conditions will bring about a certain effect depends upon the conditions as well as upon the causes, for unless similar conditions obtain, the same effect may not be produced. Also, it is well known that the same effect may often be brought about by different causes un-

der different conditions. Consequently, since the practical importance of experimental purposes is often problematical they are here treated as theoretical.

Practical purposes are those which have for their general object the production of a definite effect upon the practical affairs of life.

A practical purpose may be intuitive, empirical or tentative.

An intuitive purpose is one that seems to spring from impulse and to be completed by instinctive processes. As so understood, many if not all intuitive purposes correspond closely if not exactly to those indicated by the activities of certain of the lower animals.

An empirical purpose is that which requires appreciable mental effort for its achievement and which is known to be similar

to some purpose previously achieved and which can be repeated under present conditions. These are understood to include all the ordinary recurrent purposes of life that are not intuitive.

A tentative purpose is one that has for its object either an effect that is not known to have been produced before or the more efficient achievement of a previous purpose.

Tentative purposes are often undertaken with inadequate or false notions of probable or possible results. They thus include those which fail from an improper selection of means, those which miscarry from an inefficient use of suitable means and those which cannot be achieved by any means whatever. Far be it, however, that he who prosecutes such purposes should be disparaged, for he it

is whose enterprising spirit often causes him to blunder on fact and truth, succeed beyond all expectation and become an excellent example of what a great man judged by his works might be. In addition to this even those tentative purposes that fail or miscarry always tend to increase the store of practical experience.

Therefore, as is otherwise well known, tentative purposes, regardless of success or failure, constitute a great source of industrial and social progress.

It will be observed that, under the definitions given, the difference between an experimental purpose and a tentative purpose is that the former is achieved for sake of knowledge alone while the latter is prosecuted and completed for sake of its practical effect.

GREAT PURPOSES.

A purpose is generally considered great according to the number and importance of the subordinate purposes which are merged into the accomplishment of the final object.

A purpose is also recognized as great in proportion to the immediate and to the ultimate consequences of its achievement.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER II.

GOOD AND EVIL PURPOSES.

It is natural for men to base distinctions of good and evil upon sensations and emotions of immediate pleasure and pain rather than upon the remote consequences of the conduct or action that may result from those feelings.

This tendency is shown by the philosopher Thomas Hobbes in the statement that:

> "Every man calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, good: and that evil which displeaseth him."

The celebrated philosopher John Locke expressed himself similarly thus:

> "Things then are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain."

The same tendency is indicated by the

standard dictionaries, according to which:

Good is:

> "Adapted to give or giving pleasure."

Also: "Having qualities adapted to produce some kind of satisfaction, whether physical, mental or moral."

Evil is:

> "Producing or threatening pain, sorrow, distress, injury or calamity."

Also: Possessing injurious nature or qualities; unwholesome; h u r t f u l hostile to the welfare of any creature."

A sensation of pleasure or of pain is an effect of a certain cause upon a certain person under certain conditions.

A cause is understood to be natural when free from the influence of human control; and to be artificial when and to the degree it is subjected to such influence.

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A condition is regarded as natural when it has been brought about in the natural course of events unchanged by human interference, and as artificial to the extent that it has been affected by the conduct of man.

Experience shows that under different natural conditions the same cause may give the same man pleasure at one time and pain at another. For illustration:

Fire sometimes gives pleasure and sometimes pain, according to natural conditions and the same is true of air, of water, of the earth and, consequently, of the causes they involve. This being true, it appears that every natural cause by which a man may be affected might, under the definitions given, sometimes be good and sometimes evil while the cause itself would remain unchanged. Again, the same natural causes under the

same natural conditions may sometimes afford pleasure and sometimes give pain to the same man according to his conduct with respect to those causes and conditions.

But it is manifest that contrary epithets cannot, without qualification, be properly applied at different times to a thing that has not undergone a change.

Therefore, definite distinctions of good and evil cannot apply to natural causes or to natural conditions.

It is well known, however, that the same man will experience the same sensation of pleasure or of pain as often as he places himself in the same relations to certain natural or artificial causes and conditions; also that the sensation can be depended upon to vary in regular accordance with any change he may make in those relations.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Now, in so far as the relations of a man to any natural cause are not controlled by him they may be regarded as natural conditions, and to the extent that those relations are under his control his sensations of pleasure and of pain are determined by his own action.

Therefore, distinctions of good and evil must be established with especial reference to human conduct.

Now, human conduct may give pleasure which is followed as a consequence by comparatively greater pain, such, for instance, as dissipation, and it is clear that this should not be recognized as good. On the other hand, human conduct may give immediate pain succeeded by proportionately greater pleasure, as, for example, hard and honest labor, and it is manifest that this should not be regarded as evil.

WELFARE AND PROGRESS.

Consequently, immediate pleasure and immediate pain resulting from human conduct are not sufficient as a general basis for distinctions of good and evil.

This condition, however, may be met by basing all distinctions of good and evil upon human conduct considered with respect to its effect upon the ultimate welfare and progress of man. For, it is evident that to the extent human conduct contributes in the end to human welfare and progress it must be recognized as good and in so far as it is detrimental to the ultimate welfare and progress of man it must be regarded as evil.

Therefore, all distinctions of good and evil should be made with particular reference to the influence of human conduct upon the ultimate welfare and progress of mankind.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Human welfare, according to standard authority, is:

> "State or condition in regard to well-being; especially condition of health, happiness, prosperity and the like; negatively, exemption from evil or calamity."

This includes both physical and intellectual welfare and is understood to mean that:

Physical welfare is that state which makes it practicable to procure adequate safety, sufficient food and suitable comfort: and that:

Intellectual welfare is that condition of knowledge, intellectual ability, mental discipline and refinement in which the mind is undisturbed by fear or suffering, is able to resist temptation, control passion, banish prejudice, is qualified to achieve purposes and is not misled by any false theories or impracticable ideals.

THE PROGRESS OF MAN.

Human progress, as defined by accepted authority, is:

> "Advance in physical, mental or moral development, condition or position."

In view of the definition of **welfare** this is understood to mean that:

Physical progress is advance in physical welfare or in the conditions affecting safety, food and comfort; and that:

Intellectual progress is advance in intellectual welfare or in knowledge, intellectual ability, mental discipline and refinement.

It must be admitted that between the first appearance of man on earth and the present time there has been some human progress. For to deny this would be to deny the validity of every recognized standard of physical, social, moral, intellectual and spiritual excellence.

This progress could have been due only to natural causes, to the activities of man or to both.

This condition is well expressed by the philosophic historian Buckle as follows:

> "Thus we have man modifying nature, and nature modifying man; while out of this reciprocal action all events must spring."

The exact extent to which the progress of man to date has been brought about by natural causes is, of course, problematical but it would not seem to exceed the natural progress of the present savage who has always depended most upon natural causes and least upon his own activities. Consequently, if from the total progress of this savage there could be deducted that brought about by the efforts he has been compelled to make in advancement

of his welfare there would remain the total progress of man resulting from natural causes to date. This, according to the best available data, would be practically the natural progress of the highest of the lower animals; and this may be disregarded because, evidently, it is only the progress which has raised man above the beast that need be considered.

Therefore, natural causes except to the extent that they were used as means, have, contributed practically nothing to the advancement of human welfare.

Whence the proposition that:

> The progress of man originates in and is determined by his own conduct.

This was expressed by Buckle thus:

> "The only progress which is really effective depends not upon the bounty of nature but upon the energy of man."

For sake of completeness it is proper to enquire whether natural causes are detrimental to human progress.

Experience shows that natural causes which men constantly fear, such as those tending to produce disease and want, may often be turned to permanent advantage by the exercise of prudence, industry and thrift. Those which men dread but cannot or do not avoid seldom equal the serious apprehensions of the sufferer. Natural causes from which men suffer short of death may, as a rule, be overcome by courage, fortitude and the proper use of the means that may be at command; and even though this may involve great effort, pain and deprivation it results in progress because it leaves those who are affected better and abler than before and in addition gives to them that preeminent satisfaction afforded by the conscious-

ness of dangers past and labors well performed. Nor does there seem to be the slightest conclusive evidence that causes which are beyond control of man have ever been really inimical to his ultimate welfare and progress. On the contrary, natural causes whose painful effects cannot be avoided by human agency are often made tolerable if not beneficial by the natural laws of physical and mental adaptation. These failing, the natural result is death.

But it is certain that in common with plants and the lower animals men must die in order that their posterity may prosper and progress, so that, if judged by the greatest good to the greatest number, which is the only available criterion, it must be conceded that even death, as the result of natural causes, is not an evil.

In addition to this, were it not for the sensations and emotions of pain there would be nothing to warn men of immediate danger and thus prevent them from blindly contributing to their own destruction.

In this connection the philosopher John Locke states that:

> "Thus heat, that is very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little increase of it, proves no ordinary torment; and the most pleasant of all sensible objects, light itself, if there be too much of it, if increased beyond a due proportion to our eyes, causes a very painful sensation; which is wisely and favorably so ordered by nature, that when any object does by the vehemency of its operation disorder the instruments of sensation, whose structure cannot but be very nice and delicate, we might, by the pain, be warned to withdraw before the organ be quite put out of order, and be so unfitted for its proper function for the future."

These considerations indicate that natural causes subject to the control of man may be made to contribute either directly or indirectly to his ultimate welfare and progress and that causes not subject to human control naturally conserve if they do not contribute to that end.

Therefore, natural causes are not essentially detrimental to human progress.

Whence it appears, that natural causes, by and of themselves, tend neither to improve nor to impair the progress of man.

This means that the effects of natural causes upon human progress are determined solely by the conduct of man and from this there follows the proposition that:

> The conduct of man considered in relation to its ultimate effect upon human progress is the only proper basis for adequate distinctions of good and evil.

This same proposition is taught at least by implication in the Book of Genesis where it is written that:

> "And out of the ground made the LORD God to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food; the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil."
>
> "And the LORD God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat:
>
> But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die."

It is also written that man ate of the forbidden fruit and thus gained a knowledge of good and evil.

This must mean that man was not conscious of any distinctions of good and evil until he had become active in the pursuit of things not provided by the bounty of nature.

ADAM AND EVE.

Interpreted less abstractly the conduct of Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden means that they had been moved or tempted by a spirit which prompted escape from the ennui of a purposeless existence:

In this connection Thoreau stated.

> "Undoubtedly the very tedium and ennui which presume to have exhausted the variety and the joys of life are as old as Adam."

Also, concerning this same condition the theologian J. F. Clarke expressed himself as follows:

> "The dreadful disease of ennui, of life-weariness, attacks all who have no aim, no permanent purpose."

Now, to the spirit that prompted Adam and Eve to escape from the ennui of their original condition men have always been prone to attribute all evils which have befallen them.

This, manifestly, is equivalent to a general recognition of the condition that man could not have been conscious of any distinctions of good and evil except through the action he had taken to advance his welfare.

Since distinctions of good and evil must be based on human conduct they naturally apply to the purposes of man. Accordingly, it is here understood that:

A good purpose is one that conserves or promotes the ultimate welfare and progress of mankind.

An evil purpose, being the opposite of good, is one that is detrimental to human welfare and progress.

Every purpose that is not evil may fairly be considered good because, if not injurious, it must at least conserve the welfare and progress of man or be without practical significance.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER III.

PREDOMINANCE OF GOOD PURPOSES.

In the course of human events, what constitutes a good or an evil purpose is generally a matter of opinion based on sensations and emotions produced by immediate or impending pleasure or pain and subject to serious change in the increasing light of experience.

But even though this is the general rule it is nevertheless true that the purposes of man when considered in relation to his general welfare and progress are subject to certain fundamental conditions which may be developed from observation, experience, science and history in the following manner:

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

The achievement of a good purpose and particularly one that tends to the immediate promotion of human welfare and progress naturally creates, as is well known, not only a desire to repeat it but also a disposition to achieve other purposes of the same general character.

This is recognized by St. Matthew in the passage:

> "Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit."

The same tendency of good purposes is also beautifully expressed by the eminent divine G. P. Fisher thus:

> "One must be good in order to to do good; but it is a case where the fountain is deepened by the outflow of its waters."

Whence the ethical proposition:

> Good purposes, by reason of their satisfactory consequences, are persistent and prolific.

CORRECTION OF EVIL.

Again, although men may and do yield to temptation it is well known that every normal man is instinctively opposed to whatever violates his natural sense of justice and to whatever he thinks is inimical to his welfare and progress. And this is especially the case whenever his interests are threatened or invaded by the purposes of other men. Thus it is that evil purposes tend to create counter purposes which latter being opposed to evil are entitled to be considered good.

Whence the ethical proposition:

> Evil purposes, by reason of their unsatisfactory consequences, tend to bring about their own correction.

Now, it must be conceded that the effective progress which man has made to date could not have been attained without the predominance of his good purposes.

This predominance is recognized by Solomon in the Proverb:

> "The evil bow before the good; and the wicked at the gates of the righteous."

From these considerations and since in all such matters man must judge the future by the past there may be affirmed the ethical proposition:

> Good purposes, taken as a whole, must prevail in the end over all that are evil.

The general process by which man has made progress by virtue of this important proposition may be indicated thus:

Man being comparatively weak, slow and defenseless by nature, advanced his safety and therefore his physical welfare by the invention and use of weapons. By means of various implements he made improvements in the quality of his food and in its preparation;

this advanced his physical welfare because it improved his sources of pleasure and contributed to that general condition which, judged by experience, makes his powers of endurance, as a rule, greater than that of the lower animals. Being naturally unprotected man, by use of weapons and implements, provided himself with clothing and shelter; this advanced his physical welfare because the inconvenience of those desirable things would not be tolerated unless it were more than compensated by the pleasure, comfort and protection they afford.

In addition to the physical progress indicated, man has advanced his intellectual welfare by the acquisition of knowledge which alleviates fear of the unknown and enables him to mitigate his sufferings; by improvement in mental discipline which gives him better control of his natural propensities

and of means for achievement of his purposes; also by the gradual development of those social, moral, intellectual and spiritual qualities which give refinement to his desires and tastes and at the same time make more available the means for their gratification.

To develop the details of this general process so as to show the relations of good and evil purposes through long periods of time is one of the most important duties of the historian.

Until quite recently this duty was performed as indicated by the following quotation from the historian Buckle:

> "The unfortunate peculiarity of the history of man is, that although its separate parts have been examined with considerable ability, hardly any one has attempted to combine them into a whole, and ascertain the way in which they are connected with each other."

HISTORICAL EVIDENCE.

And yet history abounds with evidence of the ultimate predominance of good over evil purposes.

The evil purposes of the enemies of Socrates which resulted in his death gave to the doctrines of that great man an influence that otherwise they would not have obtained. And to this influence is due much of the moral progress that has since been made.

The evil purposes of the money changers who had been driven from the temple, aided by the treachery of Iscariot and abetted by the wrongful attitude of Pilate, culminated in the Crucifixion.

That ghastly and revolting episode, because of the moral progress which by that time had been made and by reason of the unexampled character and conduct of the innocent victim, outraged all sense of natural jus-

tice. It thus gave to the precepts and to the example of Christ that emphasis without which his doctrines could not so benignly and so persistently have influenced the purposes of future generations.

The purposes of the Inquisition, because of the high emotions which their cruelty aroused at the time and afterwards, had a beneficial influence upon the later purposes of men and, on the whole, have resulted in more good than evil.

The evil purposes involved in human slavery gave rise to the counter purposes which brought forth abolition to the benefit both of master and of man.

Alcoholic indulgence, by reason of its bad effects and the evil purposes it engenders continually tends to bring about its own effectual prohibition.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCE.

Purposes for exploitation of savage races generally open the way to achievement of purposes by them and by others for their eventual betterment.

The evil purposes of oppression that brought about the war of the American Revolution and events connected with that conflict resulted in establishment of higher moral principles and ideals and, generally, in greater progress than would seem to have been possible by any other process at the time.

Also, in other important cases it is known that evils attending achievement of warlike purposes have been temporary while the benefits are lasting and cumulative. This is because of the training, discipline, experience and issues which tended to enhancement of hardihood, courage, efficiency, self-sacrifice and honor and because of the good influences

of those improved qualities upon the immediate and subsequent purposes of man. And, there is not, as in the nature of things there cannot be, any conclusive evidence that the same is not true of every war that ever has been waged. In addition to this the fear of aggression naturally prompts improvements in defensive appliances and this leads to more efficient implements of industry. The desire for aggression has the same general effect. As a result there can be no doubt that the stimulus of war has contributed largely to industrial progress. And even though appearances may be to the contrary there is reason to believe that in course of time this reciprocal improvement in armament and implement will make warfare impracticable and thus give to peaceful avocations lasting benefits which,

but for war, would never have been developed.

That the historical evidence cited indicates the general trend of events in every conflict between good and evil may readily be shown.

All experience indicates that the general effect of natural causes and conditions upon the welfare and progress of man depends upon the use made of them as means for achievement of human purposes.

Therefore, the general welfare and progress of man beyond that accorded by nature to the lower animals must be the result of human agency.

This means, in effect, that every man as an intelligent agent is what he is because of the good and evil purposes of himself, of those who are with him and of those who have gone

before. And it must be conceded that the good purposes of man, taken as a whole, from the beginning to the present time have improved his condition and his character and advanced his general welfare as against all the evil purposes that have ever been achieved and in despite of all adverse influences which may have been contained in his natural environment. Consequently, even though the elements of evil, instead of being limited to human conduct as was shown, should inhere in natural causes and conditions, it is certain that man has made progress.

Therefore, those who may not concede that all distinctions of good and evil must be based on human conduct must admit the proposition that:

Good things, as a whole, must predominate all things that are evil.

CONFLICT OF GOOD AND EVIL.

Concerning the conflict between good and evil the theologian Dr. Horace Bushnell thus expressed himself:

> "No state of virtue is complete, however total the virtue, save as it is won by a conflict with evil."

The same condition is described by the historian James Anthony Froude thus:

> "Great movements which are unresisted flow violently on and waste themselves in extravagance and destruction; and revolutions which are to mark a step in the advance of mankind need always the discipline of opposition until the baser parts are beaten out of them."

The doctrine of moral evolution which was developed by the philosopher Herbert Spencer may be interpreted to mean that human conduct is a process whereby man is adapted to the conditions of his environment and that this adaptation is at its best when it

contributes most in the end to human welfare and progress; also, that this process is as natural as the adaptation of vegetable and animal organisms to the vicissitudes of environment.

This doctrine is manifestly not in conflict with the quotations cited from theology and history and is in entire agreement with all that has been developed concerning the predominance of the good over the evil.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER IV.

CAUSE, EFFECT AND PRINCIPLE.

All experience shows that achievement of any purpose consists of the production of an intended effect by the systematic application of cause.

All conceptions of cause and effect and of their relations to each other are based upon the events of existence.

An event is any kind of a change in corporeal, vital or intellectual existence which has actually come to pass.

A cause is anything which brings about or which has the ability to bring about an event.

An effect is an event that is known to have been brought about by some cause.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Creation is what would happen should an event come to pass without being the effect of any cause whatever.

According to Protagoras:

> "Man is the measure of all things: of those which are, that they are; of those which are not, that they are not."

This applied to causes may be interpreted to mean that only those by which man is or can be affected can be known to him and that no others can or need be considered. As so understood the quotation, while somewhat paradoxical, is generally recognized as being true.

The only known causes are:

The inherent powers of inert matter.

The properties of plants.

The faculties and propensities of animals.

The qualifications of intelligent agents.

ENERGIES OF EXISTENCE

Energy is ability of a cause to produce effect and is actual or potential according as the cause is or is not in operation.

The energies of existence classified with respect to their causes are:

Corporeal Energies:

> All those resulting directly from the intrinsic properties of inert matter.

Vital Energies:

> All that result directly from the organization of matter into a condition of physical vitality.

Intellectual Energies:

> Those that are due to the essential qualities of the mind and bring about all mental processes.

Trancendental Energies:

> Those assumed to arise from ideal qualities of real or imaginary things in order to account for effects or events otherwise inexplicable.

A cause is adequate with respect to a change in existence or an effect when it has the quality and quantity of energy necessary to bring about that change. The only proper test of the adequacy of the cause is the production of the effect.

A Principle is here treated as a general natural regulation without which systematic application of causes to achievement of purposes would be impracticable.

The general principles necessary for achievement of the purposes of man may be developed as follows:

The inherent powers of inert matter, properties of plants, faculties and propensities of animals and qualifications of intelligent agents are all known by experience to be efficient causes, each able to influence causes of its own as well as of every other class. Thus it is that, as is well known, the systematic ap-

plication of any given cause makes it necessary to consider not only the given cause but also its relations to every other cause of the same or of a different class.

For convenience of reference the well known conditions necessary for the proper application of a given cause to achievement of a purpose may be stated thus:

1. The given cause itself must be brought within the effective control of the person who prosecutes the purpose.

2. The given cause must be isolated from the influence of every other cause which cannot be controlled and by which the purpose might otherwise be defeated.

3. Every cause, whether of the same or of a different class, from which the given cause cannot be isolated must be under effective control.

Now, should it be possible for a change in existence to occur without any cause whatever then this change might arbitrarily affect any given cause in immediate use for achievement of some purpose and this would violate the first condition. Should the arbitrary change in existence affect any cause from which the given cause had been isolated it might break down the isolation and the second condition would be violated. Should the uncaused change affect any cause from which the given cause could not be isolated then all those causes would not be under effective control and this would violate the third condition. Should a change in existence be brought about by an inadequate cause then part of the change would be without any cause and all the conditions would be violated for the reasons stated.

Therefore, the systematic application of

any cause to achievement of any purpose requires that an effect without an adequate cause shall be impossible.

This means that achievement of purpose is impracticable without what is known as:

The Principle of Causation:

> There must be an adequate cause for every possible effect or event.

Should the same cause or a similar cause under the same or similar conditions produce different effects then the difference in effect would be an effect for which there would be no cause and this would violate the Principle of Causation.

Therefore, achievement of purpose is impracticable without what is called:

The Principle of Regulation:

> Similar causes under similar conditions must invariably produce similar effects.

Should an effect be changed by change in time or space, all other conditions and relations remaining the same, then the Principle of Regulation would be void.

Whence, achievement of purpose requires the truth of what may be styled:

The Principle of Stability:

> The effect of a cause is independent of absolute position in time or space.

Matter without ability to produce effect cannot be known and need not be considered. Consequently, should any item of corporeal existence be subject to increase or diminution without transfer of material from or to some other item then control of the energies of that item would be impracticable. One instance of this would indicate its possibility in every case and leave no dependable physical basis for systematic application of cause.

CONSERVATION OF MATTER.

Now, the systematic application of any cause without a dependable physical basis is impracticable.

Therefore, an essential condition of the achievement of a purpose is:

The Principle of Conservation of Matter:

The sum total of all corporeal substances is constant.

The systematic application of a given cause to achievement of a purpose involves, of course, effective control of its energy. In order that this may be practicable the following conditions must obtain:

1. Effective control of the energy as to action, inaction and direction.

2. Isolation of the energy from every other energy that is beyond control.

3. Effective control of every energy from which the energy of the given cause cannot be isolated.

Should it be possible for the energy of any given cause to increase or diminish in and of itself and without relation to any other cause then there might be arbitrary fluctuations which would make impracticable effective control of the energy, violate the first condition cited and, theoretically at least, make not only the given cause but every cause of the same class unfit for use in the systematic production of any intended effect. This would mean that in the achievement of human purposes all such causes should be excluded. But this exclusion, by reason of the numerous and close relations that are known to prevail among causes of different classes, would itself be the object of a purpose involving the causes in question. As a consequence, the isolation of controllable energies required in the achievement of any given purpose might

be impracticable and the second condition be violated. This would mean, of course, that there would not be effective control of energies from which controllable energies could not be isolated and this would violate the third condition.

Therefore, it is essential to achievement of human purposes that an absolute change of energy shall be impossible.

This naturally requires that no change in the energy of any cause shall be possible except through transfer of equivalent energy to or from some other cause.

Whence achievement of human purposes is impracticable without what is known as:

The Principle of Correlation:

> The exact amount of energy that is acquired or given up by any cause must invariably be given up or acquired by some other cause.

An increase in the energy of a given cause without an equivalent diminution of the energy of some other cause would be a change in existence without an adequate cause and violate the Principle of Causation. A decrease in the energy of a given cause without transfer to some other cause would be equivalent to an arbitrary decrease in energy, prevent the cause from producing similar effects under similar conditions and violate the Principle of Regulation.

Whence, as might also have been derived from the principle of Correlation, achievement of human purposes would be impracticable without what is called:

The Principle of Conservation of Energy:

> The total of the actual and potential energies of existence is invariable.

PRINCIPLES AND VITAL CAUSES.

The six principles which have been developed as indispensable to achievement of the purposes of man are the same that have been shown by processes of physical science to be true for all causes inherent in inert matter.

Whether the principles of Causation, Regulation, Stability, Correlation and Conservation of Energy are true for the properties of plants and for the faculties and propensities of animals has not been determined by science with the mathematical accuracy possible with purely physical causes; but short of arithmetical precision, there is abundant evidence that those five principles should be recognized as true for the vital causes mentioned.

Also, the testimony of science is to the effect that the principles of Causation, Regu-

lation and Stability are true for all intellectual qualifications:

The general attitude of science towards the correlation and conservation of intellectual energies is indicated by the following quotations from an appendix by Professor Alexander Bain to a treatise on The Conservation of Energy by Professor Balfour Stewart.

> "That there is a definite equivalence between mental manifestations and physical forces, the same as between the physical forces themselves, is, I think, conformable to all the facts, although liable to peculiar difficulties in the way of decisive proof:
>
> I. The mental manifestations are in exact proportion to their physical supports.
>
> If the doctrine of the thoroughgoing connection of mind and body is good for anything, it must go this length. There must be a numerically-proportioned rise and fall of the two together.

CORRELATION OF ENERGIES

Further along he states that:

> "II. There remains another application of the doctrine, perhaps equally interesting to contemplate, and more within my special line of study. I mean the correlation of the mental forces among themselves (still viewed in the conjoint arrangement). Just as we assign limits to mind as a whole, by a reference to the grant of physical expenditure, in oxidization etc., for the department, so we must assign limits to the different phases or modes of mental work—thought, feeling and so on—according to the share allotted to each; so that, while the mind as a whole may be stinted by the demands of the non-mental functions, each separate manifestation is bounded by the requirements of the others. This is an inevitable consequence of the general principle, and equally receives the confirmation of experience.

The difficulties in the way of conclusive proof by ordinary scientific processes of the

general correlation and conservation of all physical, vital and intellectual energies, which were referred to by Professor Bain, would seem to be insuperable because of the complications involved and the impossibility of obtaining the necessary exact data.

But if it can be shown that an effect or event has been brought about which could not conceivably have been produced without the general conservation and inter-correlation of all existing energies then the principles of conservation and correlation of energies may be recognized as having universal application.

Now, there can be no question that the welfare of man has been advanced as the general result of all the numerous, diverse, good and evil purposes that he has achieved from the beginning until the present time. And it

has been shown that this advancement is due to the systematic and natural predominance of good over evil purposes.

This means that systematic and successful application of causes of every kind must have been made, each in relation to and under the influence of causes and energies of every class.

Therefore, causes of every kind may be regarded as having been systematically and successfully applied to the achievement of a single purpose that had for its object the advancement of human welfare.

Consequently, the systematic application of every known cause to the achievement of a single purpose may be regarded as practicable.

But every one of the six principles developed was shown to be indispensable to the

systematic application of causes and their energies to achievement of human purposes.

Whence, it appears that:

The principles of Conservation and Correlation, in so far as man can be concerned, may be accepted as true for all physical, vital and intellectual energies.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER V.

LAW AND ORDER.

A law is here considered as a rule of natural action in virtue of which a certain cause, whenever and wherever placed under certain conditions, must invariably produce a certain effect.

The principal laws which have been so far developed may, for convenience, be classified with respect to the energies which they control, as follows:

THE LAWS OF PHYSICAL ACTION.

The Law of Gravitation:

> Any two material bodies continually attract each other with a definite force proportional to the product of their masses divided by the square of the distance between their centers.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

The Laws of Motion and Force:

Any material body acted upon by a force and then left free and undisturbed will invariably move with uniform velocity in a straight line in the direction of the action of the force.

Any force while acting on a body for a given time invariably produces a definite velocity proportional to the intensity of the force divided by the mass of the body.

To the action of every force there is invariably an equal and opposite reaction.

The Laws of Physical Energy:

The amount of energy required to produce a certain velocity in a body is equal to one half the mass of the body multiplied by the square of the velocity.

The amount of energy required to bring a moving body to rest is equal to the square of its velocity multiplied by one half its mass.

In addition to the laws cited, there are numerous others, such as those which relate

to inertia and rotation, and such as the laws by which the strength, rigidity, elasticity and flexibility of materials are governed, which need not be set forth here.

The Laws of Chemical Affinity:

> Any kinds of matter that can combine will, under the same conditions, invariably unite in definite proportion and form the same chemical compound.

The Laws of Chemical Energy:

> The same chemical combination of the same quantities of the same kinds of matter invariably liberates the same amount of energy.
>
> Disintegration of the same quantity of the same chemical compound invariably stores up the same amount of energy.

The systematic transformation of chemical into physical energy is made generally possible by numerous laws relating to development and application of heat.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Vital action is understood to be a special manifestation of chemical affinity and chemical energy. Its general laws are:

The Laws of Natural Selection:

Any species of plant or animal under conditions unsuited to its nature but not fatal naturally undergoes such changes and acquires such additional qualities as tend to adapt it to its environment.

Competition between different species or between individuals of the same species under conditions not generally destructive naturally enhances hardihood and efficiency.

Every plant or animal under conditions suitable for its propagation naturally transmits to its posterity certain inherited qualities together with other qualities acquired by itself.

The Laws of Sensation:

All those rules of organic action by which similar animal organisms from similar causes under similar conditions naturally experience similar sensations.

LAWS OF INTELLECTUAL ACTION.

The Laws of Thought:

> All those rules of intellectual action by virtue of which men of similar qualifications, starting with knowledge of certain facts and truths, do, entirely by mental processes, acquire knowledge of other facts and truths.

The Laws of Emotion:

> All those rules of mental action according to which men of similar qualifications under the influence of similar sensation and thought naturally experience similar emotions.

Intellectual action is here understood to sustain invariable but not generally determinate relations to vital action.

Since any cause that is governed by a law must invariably produce the same or a similar effect whenever and wherever it may be placed under the same or similar conditions it is evident that those conditions must be such as to bring the cause into proper initial action

and to insure production of the effect by accurate direction and control of the operation.

This means that:

Every law, by its own conditions, must be self-enforcing.

The first time any cause produces an effect it must establish a self-enforcing law for the reason that, by the Principle of Regulation, the same or a similar cause whenever and wherever placed under the same or similar conditions must invariably produce the same or a similar effect.

Consequently, whenever a cause produces an effect it must either establish a self-enforcing law or conform to one previously established by a similar cause under similar conditions.

Whence, by the Principle of Regulation:

All causes must act according to self-enforcing law.

CONDITIONS OF A LAW.

The conditions under which any cause, subject to the terms of a self-enforcing law, may have produced an effect include and are limited to its relations to every other cause by which the effect had been or might have been influenced. For it is certain that every possible influence of every other cause must be included and it is evident that there can be no occasion for the inclusion of anything else.

The production of an effect except by a cause subject to certain conditions would be equivalent to original creation and this, not being conceivable, need not be considered here.

Therefore, the action of every cause which can be conceived of as available for the achievement of a human purpose must be regarded as subject to certain determining conditions.

But it has been shown that the conditions under which any cause can produce an effect are limited to the influences of other causes.

Therefore, the action or influence of more than a single cause is always necessary for the production of an effect.

This means that:

> Every law, by virtue of its own conditions, must insure the co-operation of two or more causes.

That this proposition has not always been given the attention its importance seems to deserve is indicated by the following remark of Sir William Hamilton:

> "I have already noticed to you the error of philosophers in supposing that anything can have a single cause."

In view of what has been stated it is evident that in every case in which several causes come into co-operation and produce a single

joint effect, that effect may be regarded as having been brought about by any one of the causes according to its own self-enforcing law, the conditions of which include the influences of all the others.

Whence, by general principles of Regulation and of Stability, it must be true that:

> Similar sets of respectively similar co-operative causes must invariably come into action and produce a similar joint effect whenever and wherever they are placed under similar conditions and in the same co-operative relations to one another.

Order is here understood to be that general condition which prevails among several causes and the special conditions and relations under which they are placed, when all invariably co-operate and produce the same single joint effect.

Rules of Order are special natural rules of relative action, reaction and inaction by virtue of which several definite causes invariably come into co-operation and produce a similar joint effect whenever and wherever they are placed under similar extraneous conditions and in the same co-operative relations.

From this definition the proposition last developed may be stated thus:

> Similar sets of respectively similar co-operative causes must invariably come into action and produce a similar joint effect whenever and wherever placed under similar rules of order.

Since, as has been shown, every joint effect of several causes may be regarded as the effect of any one of the causes acting according to its own self-enforcing law, rules of order may be treated as rules defining the conditions and relations under which a given cause may

be depended upon to come into operation and produce a required effect.

The rules of order under which causes cooperate are of incalculable number and variety. This is, of course, because of the close and efficient relations that prevail among causes and because of the many different combinations of causes, conditions and relations under which they will produce joint effects.

The rules of order that have been developed and reduced to writing are classified, according to the phenomena to which they relate, under the heads of Astronomy, Physics, Mechanics, Chemistry, Botany, Zoology, Metaphysics, Jurisprudence etc., and are available in the numerous treatises on those subjects as a theoretical basis for achievement of human purposes.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

The systematic application of causes to achievement of a single purpose through principles, laws and rules of order may be illustrated practically thus:

An engineer in designing a steam pile driver depends upon the six general principles of existence for control and isolation of the causes and energies he intends to use; he depends upon the laws of gravity and of motion and force and upon the ascertained strength, rigidity, elasticity and other qualities of various kinds of matter as being the same for similar materials; he also depends upon the chemical energies of fuel as the source of power for the machine. With these as a basis he specifies certain rules of order which he knows must be observed in the material, shape, dimensions and relative position of each part to the end that the completed machine when subjected to

certain conditions will come into action and deliver a powerful impact upon a pile.

To make the machine thus designed the manufacturer must apply certain rules of order with respect to the tools and the materials he must use and in addition he must apply other rules of order necessary for the co-operation of his employes.

The pile driver having been completed, is placed at the disposal of an organization of men who under certain rules of order must co-operate with one another to produce the effect for which the machine was designed and constructed.

Rules of order for the systematic co-operation of men must, of course, be based upon physical principles and laws but they all naturally depend directly upon the laws of sensation, thought and emotion.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

With due regard to standard authority, sensation, thought and emotion, respectively, are here understood as indicated by the following definitions:

Sensation is an immediate feeling of pleasure or of pain produced in the mind whenever a cause perceptibly affects an organ of sense.

This definition is based on the consideration that a sensation without any perceptible pleasure or pain would be without practical significance.

Thought is that process by which the mind, entirely through the exercise of its own powers, acquires knowledge and improves its faculties and capacities.

The only available data for processes of thought are: events of existence indicated by sensation; self evident propositions and assumptions of the imagination.

SENSATION, THOUGHT AND EMOTION.

Emotion is a state of mind brought about entirely by the action of the mind itself while under the influence of sensation, of thought or of both.

The mental condition manifested through emotion is understood to be that by which the mind is moved to the determination of a purpose. This means that emotion is the state of mind through which sensation and thought are given practical expression.

Accordingly, the general practical relations of sensation, thought and emotion to one another are understood to be that:

The practical significance of a sensation depends upon the emotions it arouses, the nature of those emotions depends upon the state of the body and the qualifications of the mind; manifestations of emotion are determined by extraneous influences and processes of thought.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Were the conduct of men determined entirely by sensation their co-operation might be gained through influence of natural conditions as in the case of animals when confronted with a common danger. But the action of a man is often widely different from what might be expected from such influences. The reasons are, as already indicated, that the conduct of a man is determined by his emotions; that these are continually influenced by fluctuations of sensation of which an observer can have no definite knowledge; that emotions are also determined largely by propensities, peculiarities and habits of thought of which the man himself may not have adequate conceptions.

This being true, it is manifest that in order that men may be brought to work systematically and persistently towards a common object

they must be subjected to some general condition of power and scope sufficient to counteract those obscure and complicated influences which affect their individual thoughts and emotions and tend to cause independent action.

Now, the only general condition that can be depended upon to control the individual thoughts and emotions of a number of men sufficiently to bring about and maintain their systematic co-operation is that which conserves or advances or which they believe will conserve or advance their individual and collective welfare.

Whence, as is otherwise well known, human welfare and progress affords the only practicable basis for rules of order by which the systematic co-operation of men can be effected.

LAW AND ORDER.

Law and Order is understood to be that general condition under which all causes involved must act and all effects must be produced according to self-enforcing laws and rules of order.

The unbroken testimony of science is that all phenomena of physical, vital and intellectual existence come to pass according to law and rules of order and that there prevails among them a perfect state of universal self-enforcing Law and Order.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER VI.

MEANS AND METHOD.

Means is here understood to include:

> Every cause, agency, truth, fact, condition or relation that is available for achievement of the purposes of man.

The means available for achievement of human purposes may be summarized thus:

Existing Causes:

> Inherent powers of inert matter; properties of plants; faculties and propensities of animals; qualifications of intelligent agents.

General Principles of Existence.

Conditions and Relations under which causes will come into operation.

Laws of Physical, Vital and Intellectual action.

Rules of Order under which causes will come into action and produce joint effects.

Method is here regarded as the manner in which means are applied to the achievement of purposes or, more explicitly as:

> The systematic procedure by which a purpose is determined in the mind and adequate means are developed, selected, obtained and applied to accomplishment of the object.

Analytical method is that by which a conception, material body or an event or effect is separated into its constituent elements or causes.

Synthetic method is the procedure by which elements or causes are combined so as to produce a certain conception, material body, effect or event.

The method employed in any given case may be analytical or synthetic or it may involve both kinds according to the nature of the purpose and the known means available for its achievement.

METHOD.

Methods available for achievement of purposes relating to practical affairs have for their theoretical basis the following general process:

Formation of some conception of a final effect.

Discovery of all subordinate effects which must be produced.

Development of the means necessaryfor production of all required effects.

Ascertainment that adequate means are obtainable.

Determination of the purpose in the mind with due regard to obtainable means.

Isolation of all the required causes from every influence that might otherwise defeat the purpose.

Installation of the necessary causes under such conditions, relations and rules of order that they will come into proper co-operation and produce the final intended effect.

In this general procedure it will be observed that, by definition, the discovery of subordinate effects and development of necessary means are analytical processes while all the others are synthetic.

The theoretical procedure which has been outlined may be illustrated by the following practical examples:

A man from his observation and experience concerning structures forms a general conception of a building.

He prepares plans and specifications and thus discovers the subordinate effects that must be produced and develops the means required to complete the structure.

Then, should he be inclined to proceed further, he would first make sure that adequate means would be obtainable.

This having been done, he would resolve

to construct the building and would thus determine the purposes in his mind.

He would then isolate the required causes by providing a site, enclosing it if necessary, and assembling upon it suitable men and materials free from outside influences.

Finally he would install the men and materials under conditions, relations and rules of order necessary to bring all into proper cooperation and produce the structure intended.

This procedure, however, would apply in strictness only to the first building of the kind that this man might erect since, in case of a second similar structure, the analytical processes of discovering subordinate effects and developing necessary means would not be required.

In case of a farmer who, at the beginning of a season, with sufficient means at hand de-

termines to reproduce a certain crop by methods previously employed the analytical processes for discovery of subordinate effects and development of necessary means would not be required because the effects would be known and the means would be at hand.

Therefore, in this and in every similar instance all methods would be synthetic. And the same is true of all purposes relating to practical affairs which are repeatedly achieved by the same person with the same means and by the same methods.

Thus, in the ordinary recurrent purposes of practical life the natural tendency of experience is to reduce analytical processes to a minimum and, consequently, to lead practical men to depend more and more upon synthetic methods for the achievement of their purposes.

ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS.

The metaphysical distinction between analysis and synthesis is explained by Sir William Hamilton thus:

> "In so far, therefore, as philosophy is the research of causes, the one necessary condition of its possibility is the decomposition of effects into their constituted causes. This is the fundamental procedure of philosophy, and is called by a Greek term **Analysis.** But though analysis may be the fundamental procedure, it is still only a means toward an end. We analyze only that we may comprehend: and we comprehend only inasmuch as we are able to reconstruct in thought the complex effects which we have analyzed into their elements. This mental reconstruction is, therefore, the final, consummative procedure of philosophy, and it is known by the Greek term **Synthesis.**"

This abstract distinction, however, is not sufficient for purposes of practical philosophy because it limits the knowledge of

causes to ability to reconstruct **in thought alone** the complex effects that have been analyzed into their elements; whereas, in order that the knowledge shall be complete, it must confer ability to reconstruct the effect in actual practice.

In addition to this much knowledge of great practical importance is acquired entirely by synthetic processes in the prosecution of experimental and tentative purposes with a view to improvement and development of means and methods.

It is well known that while sets of respectively similar causes acting under certain laws and rules of order must produce similar effects, it is also true that:

> The same effect may generally be produced by different causes acting under different rules of order.

It is in virtue of this important propo-

sition that men, under the changing conditions of practical life, are enabled, by modification of means and methods to reproduce effects necessary for their safety, subsistance and comfort and thus adapt themselves to the vicissitudes of their environment.

Also, were the proposition not true, then there would be but one way of doing anything and all the numerous and great improvements in means and methods which contribute so largely to human progress would be impracticable; such as, for instance, improvements in means and methods available for agriculture, mining, manufacture and transportation.

Another great source of progress is to be found in the proposition that:

> Different effects may be produced by the same or respectively similar causes under different rules of order.

By virtue of this proposition it is often practicable to increase to a wonderful degree the number and importance of the purposes that may readily be achieved by the same obtainable means. For illustration:

The physical energy of gravitation, by means of an elevated body of water, is used for the production of heat, light and electricty and for purposes of irrigation, manufacture and transportation; the chemical energies of combustion are used for the same purposes and for numerous others widely different in kind and the same is true of the properties of plants and animals. And above all, the qualifications of intelligent agents may be applied to all the innumerable purposes necessary for the conservation and advancement of human welfare.

RESOURCES.

That the resources known to be available for achievement of the purposes of man are commensurate with his actual and potential ability to make efficient use of them is indicated by the abundance, diversity and efficiency of causes; by the manifold and intimate relations that prevail among physical, vital and intellectual causes and their energies; by the general principles by which causes and their energies are conserved and controlled; by the incalculable number of conditions and relations under which causes will come into action; by the self-enforcing laws by which all causes and energies are governed; by the innumerable rules of order under which causes will come into co-operation; by the variety of methods by which different causes may be subjected to different rules of order and thus

be made to produce similar effects; by the different effects which, by change of method, may be brought about by similar causes.

This provision of means and methods, however, is not more wonderful than the condition that howsoever ignorant and imperfect man may be; howsoever great may be his blunders; howsoever disastrous may be his conduct he will invariably be brought back into the proper course of progress by the marvelous provision that:

> Good things, as a whole, must predominate all that are evil.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER VII.

INTELLECTUAL EFFICIENCY.

Intellectual efficiency is understood to be that state or condition of the mind which qualifies a man in disposition and ability for the systematic application of means and method to achievement of purposes without present or immediate regard to distinctions of good and evil.

The only known criterion by which the intellectual efficiency of a man can be properly judged is to be found in the purposes he has actually achieved.

Now, in order that the achievements of a man may be a proper measure of his intellectual efficiency he must, of course, be free to respond to the influences brought to bear on his mind and must not be unduly deprived of suitable means.

For this reason, in treating of intellectual efficiency, it will be assumed that no man is improperly restrained and that every man can obtain adequate means for the proper achievement of every purpose within the range of his mental capacities and faculties.

Accordingly, intellectual efficiency will be treated as that state or condition of mind which manifests itself in the systematic achievement of purposes.

The qualifications which constitute intellectual efficiency are understood to involve, either directly or indirectly, every elemental capacity, faculty and propensity of mind; for otherwise there would be certain qualities for which there would be no use and this is inconsistent with the general economy of existence as known to man.

INTELLECTUAL QUALIFICATIONS.

Observation and experience, however, show that the elements of mind like the elements of physical existence must enter into various combinations in order to be available for the systematic achievement of purposes.

Therefore, the intellectual qualifications necessary for achievement of human purposes may be regarded generally as combinations of elemental properties, faculties and propensities of the mind.

Under the definitions given it is evident that the first condition of intellectual efficiency is an adequate disposition for achievement which will here be designated by the term Spirit.

The nature of Spirit as here understood may be developed from the following dialogue

which appears in the First Alcibiades of Plato:

Socrates. Now then, does not a man use his whole body?

Alcibiades. Unquestionably.

Socrates. But we are agreed that he who uses, and that which is used, are different.

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. A man is, therefore, different from his body?

Alcibiades. So I think.

Socrates. What then is a man?

Alcibiades. I cannot say.

Socrates. You can at least say that the man is that which uses the body?

Alcibiades. True.

Socrates. Now does anything use the body but the mind.

Alcibiades. Nothing.

MIND AND BODY.

Socrates. The mind is, therefore, the man.

Alcibiades. The mind alone.

The distinction here made between the mind and the body on the basis of use is recognized by Aristotle the foremost exponent of practical action as well as by Sir William Hamilton who seems to have given such action slight consideration.

Now, while the mind uses the body as a means for achievement it also employs certain qualifications of its own. So that on a basis of use the mind may be regarded as that which uses all intellectual qualifications employed in the achievement of purposes. Or, to state it differently, the mind is that which would remain after all its useful capacities and faculties had been eliminated. This would leave what is generally known as Spirit which, in its most

comprehensive sense has been defined by a leading authority as:

> "The soul of man; the intelligent, immaterial and immortal part of human beings."

The only way in which practical significance can be given to this abstract conception is to consider spirit as the equivalent of a disposition for effort or action; for it is only through this disposition that spirit can manifest itself. And the only way in which a disposition for effort or action can represent the intelligent part of man is by the systematic achievement of purposes. Thus, evidently, from these considerations, spirit is more concretely defined by the same authority as:

> "Eager desire; disposition of mind excited and directed to a particular object."

SPIRIT.

Similarly, according to another recognized authority, spirit is:

> "That which pervades and tempers the conduct and thought of men."

Thus it appears that spirit is to the mind what life is to the body and that as, to the extent that life is absent a body may not be recognized as an effective organism, so to the extent that a man is not endowed with spirit he may not be recognized as an intelligent agent.

But although from what has been stated spirit when taken in the abstract represents the primordial substance of mind it may, when considered with respect to the practical affairs of life, be accepted as equivalent to a disposition for the systematic achievement of purposes and, consequently, may be treated as an intellectual qualification.

Accordingly, spirit is here understood to be:

> That disposition for intelligent effort which prompts the mind to the systematic achievement of purposes.

As so regarded, spirit first manifests itself in the apparently aimless conduct of the infant, gradually develops under the influence of sensation, habit, thought and emotion and culminates in enterprise, industry and ambition.

Natural spirit is that aroused by the pleasure, pain, desire, fear or curiosity due to the influence of natural causes and to inherent propensities and corresponds to that which incites the lower animals to action.

Acquired spirit is that which arises from habit, study, thought and the stimulation of mind induced by pride of actual achievement.

SPIRIT.

In view of the evident high character and importance of a disposition for proper, intelligent and practical action the neglect with which the spirit of practical achievement has been treated since the time of Aristotle stands forth as a remarkable feature of philosophy. This is because most philosophers are so absorbed in the mere exercise of their mental faculties that they do not realize the importance of practical effort. The great metaphysician Sir William Hamilton admits this, in effect, thus:

> "But it is not knowledge,—it is not truth,—that he principally seeks; he seeks the exercise of his faculties and feelings; and, as in following after the one he exerts a greater amount of pleasurable energy than in taking formal possession of the thousand, he disdains the certainty of the many, and prefers the chances of the one."

The general result of this is indicated by the historian Buckle as follows:

> "And whoever will take the pains fairly to estimate the present condition of mental philosophy, must admit that, notwithstanding the influence it has always exercised over some of the most powerful minds, and through them, over society at large, there is, nevertheless, no other study which has been so zealously prosecuted, so long continued, and yet remains so barren of results."

However great may be the spirit of a man it is certain he will be able to achieve no intelligent purpose without adequate knowledge.

As an object of philosophical consideration knowledge admits of two distinct classifications:

One of these is based upon the manner in which the knowledge has been acquired without regard to the use that may be made

of it and is that usually employed by metaphysical philosophers. The other classification has for its basis the immediate application of knowledge as a means for achievement of purposes and is generally used by practical philosophers and men of affairs.

Considered with respect to the manner of its acquisition, knowledge was classed by the philosopher Locke in effect thus:

Intuitive Knowledge:

> That which is acquired without apparent mental effort, such as knowledge of the axioms of mathematics and such as knowledge that a heavy body unsupported will fall towards the earth.

Demonstrative Knowledge:

> That which is gained by study and thought concerning the data of intuitive knowledge and concerning the facts and truths discovered through observation and experiment.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Knowledge considered with respect to its immediate application to achievement of practical purposes may be classified as follows:

Theoretical Knowledge:

> That which is acquired in the prosecution and completion of theoretical purposes and which cannot be immediately applied by its possessor to practical affairs.

Practical Knowledge:

> That which by virtue of experience gained through its previous use may readily be applied by its possessor to the prosecution and completion of practical purposes.

According to this classification, items of practical knowledge may be likened unto servants who are under immediate call, while items of theoretical knowledge are like outdoor servants who must be sent for and even searched for and who may not be found until too late.

KNOWLEDGE.

It is well known that certain knowledge which is theoretical to one man may be practical to another and that numerous important items of knowledge which at some time in the past were theoretical to all who possessed them are now practical to many men.

Therefore, the classification last given would seem to relate less to the knowledge than to the general state of the mind that happens to possess it and is, of course, the better basis for a consideration of knowledge as an intellectual qualification necessary for the achievement of practical purposes.

It must be admitted that the only conclusive evidence of the ability of a man to apply an item of knowledge to achievement of a practical purpose is the fact of his actually having done so.

Therefore, all knowledge may be regarded as theoretical until made practical by the prosecution and completion of appropriate purposes.

Now, any purpose with the knowledge acquired through its completion may afterwards be achieved in the same manner provided, of course, that exactly the same conditions obtain and the same means are available. In every such an ideal case spirit and knowledge are the only intellectual qualifications necessary for the achievement of the purpose.

But conditions as well as means are continually undergoing change so that in strictness it seldom if ever happens that a purpose can be achieved by spirit and knowledge alone. Thus it is that ability to achieve purposes must involve some additional qualification of mind.

DISCRETION.

This additional qualification is that which enables the mind to modify means and methods according to the changing conditions of practice in order that an object which has been accomplished under certain conditions, with certain means and by certain methods, may also be readily accomplished under different conditions, with different means and by different methods. This quality is often refered to as sagacity; but sagacity is generally understood to be common to man and the lower animals and, consequently, does not appear to have sufficient breadth of meaning. The qualification here considered is more properly sagacity improved and developed by thought concerning the data of knowledge. Accordingly, it will be given the more comprehensive title of **Discretion** taken in the sense indicated by the following description by the

historian Hume in his "Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals."

> "The quality most necessary for the execution of any useful enterprise is **discretion:** by which we carry on a safe intercourse with others, give due attention to our own and to their character, weigh each circumstance of the business we undertake, and employ the surest and safest means for the attainment of any end or purpose."

As so understood Discretion may be defined as:

> That combination of properties and faculties which, when united with the proper spirit and adequate knowledge, qualifies the mind for the achievement of purposes relating to practical affairs.

From this definition it follows that the intellectual qualifications that constitute intellectual efficiency are: spirit, practical knowledge and discretion.

SPIRIT, KNOWLEDGE AND DISCRETION.

In order that a man may justify his intellectual efficiency, as here understood, he must not only possess spirit, knowledge and discretion but he must also manifest those qualifications with proper regard for the relations which they naturally sustain to one another.

Should the spirit of a man transcend his knowledge or his discretion his intellectual efficiency might be diminished rather than increased because his excess of spirit would be either without the direction of knowledge or the control of discretion and he would tend to overreach himself. This is the normal condition of the youthful mind in which natural spirit predominates until knowledge and discretion shall have been acquired. Also it is, of course, the condition of those mature minds in which natural and acquired spirit outrange

knowledge and discretion and bring about disaster.

Should a man acquire knowledge beyond the scope of his spirit or of his discretion, then, either his spirit would not or his discretion could not make proper use of the surplus so that no increase in his intellectual efficiency could manifest itself except by accident. This is why the achievements of some men often do not measure up to their extensive learning.

Should discretion be in excess of spirit or of knowledge intellectual efficiency would not be perceptibly increased because the surplus would either want the incentive of spirit or it would be without the data of knowledge. Thus it is that through absence of initiative or lack of education men do not or cannot take advantage of their opportunities.

INTELLECTUAL EFFICIENCY.

In view of these considerations and of the definitions that have been given:

Intellectual efficiency is here understood to be:

> A proportionate and efficient combination of spirit, practical knowledge and discretion.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER VIII.

FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL EFFICIENCY.

The forms under which intellectual efficiency manifests itself may be discussed under the two general heads of theoretical ability and practical ability.

Theoretical ability is that state of mind which manifests itself exclusively in achievement of theoretical purposes.

Accordingly, theoretical ability is limited to acquisition, conservation and inculcation of knowledge without regard to its definite or immediate application.

Theoretical ability, considered with respect to its purposes, may be classed into speculative, mathematical and experimental ability.

THEORETICAL ABILITY.

Speculative ability is that condition which qualifies the mind for prosecution of speculative purposes.

Mathematical ability is ability to discover, develop and explain the relations of magnitude.

Experimental ability is that which manifests itself in discovery by study, thought and experiment, of the relations of cause and effect.

Theoretical ability is naturally a great source of knowledge for use as a means for achievement of practical purposes. To the extent knowledge from that source can be so used it is evident that theoretical ability itself may be treated as available means; and to the extent, if any, that such knowledge can not be so used theoretical ability may be regarded as a trancendental subject that needs not be con-

sidered here further than especial occasion may require.

Practical ability is that state or condition of mind which qualifies a man for achievement of practical purposes; or, when considered with respect to its practical relation to theoretical ability:

Practical ability is that condition of the mind which manifests itself in the application of theoretical ability and other available means to the practical affairs of life.

Practical ability manifests itself under different forms which are here distinguished as dexterity, skill and executive ability according to the character of the individual, the nature of the purpose and the means and methods available for its achievement.

The practical significance of each of these

forms of ability as developed from the data of observation, experience, history and science may be outlined as follows:

Dexterity is ability to achieve a practical purpose solely by means of the mental and physical capacities and faculties of the individual. Its feeble beginnings are observable in the infant and in maturity it is evidenced by such activities as talking, singing, walking, running, dancing, climbing, swimming, etc. In the earlier stages of human existence dexterity manifested itself by cunning, swiftness and agility in escaping danger and in procuring food and comfort. It grew with the knowledge gained through experience, with the discretion developed by primitive processes and with the practice incited by fear and desire. Its gradual and natural development gave add-

ed activity and strength together with increased ability and disposition to acquire greater dexterity still. By the laws of natural selection it instinctively improved along lines best suited to the individual and his environment, thus forming the basis of the safety and comfort without which systematic progress along other lines would have been impracticable.

But although dexterity is indispensable to progress it has serious limitations. For every feat must be within the feeble powers of the individual and thus when taken by itself can not be of great importance. Moreover, he who relies entirely on his own dexterity can prosecute but a single rational purpose at a time so that the achievements of such a man proceed in single file and thus present a weak formation. Furthermore, by dexterity alone

the purposes of different men, even when there is no conflict, cannot be systematically subordinated to a single purpose of general significance. Owing to these limitations it could not have been until after man had advanced beyond the stage of simple dexterity that his conquest of the lower animals began.

Skill is here considered as ability to achieve a purpose by intelligent and immediate use of powers of inert matter, properties of plants and faculties and propensities of animals. As so understood, skill is manifested in the use of tools, in expert performance upon instruments, in horticulture, in agriculture, in successful medical practice and surgical operations, in manufacture and use of machinery, in management and use of domestic animals and in numerous other vocations requiring the use

of similar means. It seems to have had its origin in the necessity for weapons of offense and defense against certain of the lower animals. Beginning with the club, ready and at hand, skill, by means of the knot and the properties of wood and stone, achieved the axe, thence the javelin and thence the bow and arrow. The making and use of these weapons opened up a wide field for further development of dexterity and this in turn broadened the range of the skill that had made it possible.

The development of skill facilitates and encourages its own growth and thus stimulates the spirit to make still further progress. For this reason, and from necessity, skill at an early stage discovered the properties of metals and made use of them, first in improvement of weapons and then in development of imple-

ments of industry. This led to still more effective weapons and implements and so on continually even to the present time. The crude weapons and implements originally developed were practically the first personal property possessed by man.

Thus it appears that skill, by giving existence and value to personal property not only gave incentive to further effort for improvement but made possible the progress of man far beyond the point to which dexterity alone could have taken him.

But skill, though superior to dexterity as a means of progress, has similar limitations. For every purpose possible to a man of skill must have his personal attention to the detail, and while he may use the powers of inert matter, the properties of plants and the faculties

and propensities of animals he still must depend continually upon his own abilities and endurance. Again, he who relies entirely on his own skill can seldom prosecute more than a single purpose at a time and, therefore, cannot, as a rule, consolidate his efforts. Moreover, since skill does not involve ability to manage men it can neither prevent the prosecution of adverse purposes nor cause those which do not conflict to merge into a single purpose of magnified importance. Consequently, great purposes are generally beyond the range of skill.

Executive ability is ability to achieve purposes by means of the qualifications of intelligent agents. Or, it may be more explicitly stated to be the ability to cause different men to subordinate their abilities and co-operate

in the achievement of a common purpose.

Until man by his skill had acquired some personal property his executive ability, no doubt, was limited to those slight traces shown by such of the lower animals as habitually exercise leadership for the sake of food and safety. But when men had realized the satisfaction to be derived from the products of skill and industry there naturally arose a desire for such things out of all proportion to ability or disposition to produce them. Thereupon, and in the absence of all direction and control, some men began to take by violence and stealth the property which had been acquired by others through their greater skill and industry. This naturally produced conflict and confusion among the purposes of different men, the only escape from which lay in caus-

ing men to subordinate their conflicting purposes to a general state of social order. For reasons given skill was not equal to this task. So that, by bringing about a situation which required intelligent co-operation, skill had contributed to a condition with which it could not cope and for which the only remedy was to be found in the development of executive ability.

Whence it appears that executive ability had its origin in the necessity of co-operation for mutual protection.

Having thus been forced to establish a tolerable state of social order, men discovered the power of systematic co-operation and thence found that thereby other desirable objects entirely beyond the range of dexterity and skill could be readily accomplished. Accordingly, executive ability began its course

and gradually became as it is today the genius of social and industrial progress.

The man of executive ability, out of his own knowledge and discretion or from the knowledge and discretion of other men determines whether the objects he desires are practicable and is able to select and govern those who can select and govern men who in turn are able to select and govern others and so on down to men of suitable dexterity and skill.

Such a man, having determined upon a practical purpose, prepares the proper rules and regulations, selects the proper men and by appeal to their sensations, emotions and thoughts, enforces all his rules. These men, being qualified, select and apply all other means and the object is accomplished as a natural consequence. Thus by prescription and

enforcement of proper rules of order he uses the intellectual qualifications of other men and so conserves his time and energies.

Should this man intrust the enforcement of his rules of order to a manager of suitable executive ability he would have a state of self-enforcing Law and Order which he might leave entirely to itself and thus be free to turn his mind to something else. He might then repeat the process and by means of other managers carry forward several important purposes at once and by such action show more practical ability than would be shown by the prosecution and completion of a single purpose at a time.

Then, should this man correlate his purposes and under self-enforcing rules and regulations cause his managers to co-operate so as

to accomplish an object of magnified importance he should show greater executive ability than any of his managers. And, similarly, each manager would show greater ability than would be shown by any man of dexterity or of skill who might be subject to his control.

Whence, it appears that:

> The most efficient form of practical ability possible to any man must manifest itself in executive ability and is measured by the magnitude and scope of the correlated states of self-enforcing Law and Order he is able to establish and maintain.

Since executive ability must manifest itself in the direction and control of men its efficiency naturally depends upon the practical significance of what is known as Free Will.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER IX.

FREE WILL AND EXECUTIVE ABILITY.

Advocates of Free Will insist that every man is conscious of his own Free agency; that this consciousness, being without exception cannot be denied and that, as a consequence, human action is independent of causes.

Opponents of this doctrine contend that the mind after the determination of a purpose is different from what it was before; that this difference represents an effect; that this effect, by the Principle of Causation, must be due to the action of some cause and that this cause must act according to the Principle of Regulation.

Others hold that action without cause is inconceivable; that cause is inconceivable except as the effect of preceding cause; that, consequently, Free Will is not a proper object of thought and that this being true, Free-agency can be neither proved nor disproved by reasoning from abstract propositions.

This purely metaphysical aspect of Free Will is clearly set forth by Sir William Hamilton thus:

> "It would, therefore have been better to show articulately that Liberty and Necessity are both incomprehensible, as both beyond the limits of legitimate thought; but that though the Free-agency of Man cannot be speculatively proved, neither can it be speculatively disproved."

Considering Free Will in the abstract this quotation seems unanswerable and, therefore, it will be accepted as true.

Whence, if the problem of Free Will is possible its solution must be reached through the known facts and conditions of human conduct or action.

Should the spirit of a man be entirely isolated from the influences of his sensations and emotions and should he then take action there would be conclusive evidence of Free Will. But the nearest approach to this condition is that of sleep in which isolation from sensation and emotion is not known to be complete.

In the event it could be proved that a man had been influenced equally in two different directions at the same time and that he had taken one course rather than the other then it might be conceded that he had exercised Free Will in determining upon his action. While it is conceivable that such a condition might

exist it would be impossible to prove it because the action of a man may be influenced by causes of which even he might not be conscious and of which an observer could have no knowledge.

Were it possible to prove that the same man under the same conditions had acted differently at different times then the existence of Free Will would have been demonstrated. But every man is continually undergoing mental and physical changes so that no man remains exactly the same from time to time. Also, the conditions by which the conduct or action of any and every man may be affected are likewise undergoing continual change. Consequently, in the nature of things, the same man cannot be placed under the same conditions at different times.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

From the considerations set forth it appears that there is no particular fact of experience available as conclusive evidence of Free Will.

This however, does not disprove the doctrine of Free Will; it merely shows the inability of man to demonstrate the existence of Free-agency from any particular fact within the range of his possible experience.

But although the existence of Free Will cannot be proved by particular fact, neither can it be so disproved.

The truth of this is readily shown by the self-evident proposition that:

> An apparent absence of Free Will may be caused by an act of Free Will itself.

Assuming the existence of Free Will the practical significance of this proposition may be illustrated by Executive Ability which has

been shown to be the most efficient form of practical ability.

A man of Free Will and of pre-eminent executive ability might conceivably establish a perfect self-enforcing organization involving many employes.

Now, the Free Will of every employe, while at work, would have been subordinated to the general state of Law and Order established by the chief executive.

In course of time the chief executive, in the exercise of his Free Will and with confidence in his self-enforcing rules and regulations, might leave the organization entirely to itself and devote his energies to other affairs.

Under such conditions it is conceivable that the organization, in virtue of its practically perfect state of Law and Order, might continue indefinitely its operations as before.

And the situation would be the same even though the chief executive had been removed by death.

In this illustration the only evidence of Free Will would be that deduced from the state of Law and Order in the organization taken as a whole.

This means that:

> Free Will does not require its own direct or special manifestation.

In addition to this it has been shown, in effect, that:

> Executive ability, the highest degree of practical ability, is measured by the magnitude and scope of the correlated states of self-enforcing Law and Order it is able to establish and maintain.

Whence the proposition that:

> The greater the executive ability, the less should be the special manifestations of Free Will.

FREE WILL AND EXECUTIVE ABILITY.

This proposition is justified by experience which shows that the man who believes he has Free Will and persists in its special manifestations is wanting in executive ability and not qualified for achievement of great purposes.

But while the problem of Free Will cannot be solved from particular fact the general predominance of good purposes indicates, if it does not prove, that even though man may be by nature a free agent he is practically not so because of the influences to which he is continually subjected and which effectively control his conduct as a whole. That is, man being persistently driven to advance his ultimate welfare, his will cannot, in practice, be recognized as absolutely free.

Leaving out of consideration the controversial problem of Free Will it must be admit-

ted that executive ability is based upon the proposition that:

> In order to induce a man of adequate intellectual efficiency to achieve a given purpose it is only necessary to provide him with suitable means and subject his sensations and thoughts to certain influences.

It must be conceded that there are innumerable indications that this proposition is not true. None of these indications, however, is of any practical significance because, in the nature of things, there cannot be conclusive evidence that each did not arise either from mental inaptitude or from extraneous influences.

Were the proposition not practical then it is certain that no man could be depended upon to perform an allotted task; that men could not be subjected to discipline and that, consequently, the achievement of every purpose re-

quiring their systematic co-operation would be impracticable.

That the proposition is practical is shown by the uniform and unquestioned efficiency of executive ability in the achievement of the numerous great and important purposes which involve systematic co-operation of many men and which mark the course of industrial, commercial and social progress.

Whence, it must be admitted that there is not the slightest practical objection to the proposition that:

> Any man unrestrained and of adequate ability, with suitable means and with his sensations and thoughts subjected to certain influences may be intrusted with the achievement of a certain purpose with the same confidence that fuel at a proper temperature in the open air may be depended upon to produce combustion.

The application of this proposition to the practical affairs of life is attended with much difficulty; not because it is untrue but because, at the present stage of human progress, the abilities and aptitudes of different men and the influences to which they will respond are so largely matters of conjecture.

This condition, however, naturally improves as men learn by experience that their individual interests are best subserved by co-operation for advancement of the common welfare.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER X.

THE WISDOM OF MAN.

The term **Wisdom,** or its equivalent in dead and living languages, taken in its greatest sense, has always been used to denote the highest degree of intellectual excellence.

But although authorities are generally agreed in regard to wisdom in the abstract there always have been wide differences of opinion concerning the nature and practical significance of that most excellent condition of the mind.

Therefore, it behooves any one who may venture to form an adequate conception of wisdom to consider and compare the conceptions of others; to reject those that are demonstrably

deficient and then to establish his own conception with proper regard to those which may remain.

It is written in the Book of Proverbs that:

> "For wisdom is better than rubies; and all the things that may be desired are not to be compared to it."

Thus did Solomon not only declare wisdom to be the highest degree of intellectual excellence but also gave to it pre-eminence above all other things.

In the Book of Proverbs there is also written:

> "Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways and be wise."

This shows that Solomon included in his conception of wisdom a disposition to effort as manifested by certain of the lower animals in procuring their safety, food and comfort.

SOLOMON AND SOCRATES.

And Solomon himself had this disposition to a high degree, because history shows that he valued wisdom, sought it and even prayed his God to give it to him in order that he might judge between good and bad and rule his people well. That is, he valued wisdom and sought it as a means for the systematic advancement of human welfare.

But although the wise king fully recognized a disposition for effort or action as an element of wisdom he did not fail to realize the importance of keeping that disposition under proper direction and control, as is shown by the Proverb:

> "Seest thou a man wise in his own conceit? there is more hope of a fool than of him."

Socrates, often called the greatest of moral philosophers, believed wisdom to be so

far beyond the intellectual excellence possible to man that:

> "The wisest man is he who knows there is no wisdom in him."

But during the trial at which he was condemned to death for his doctrines he declared that he was guided by a Daemon or voice divine which often forbade him to act but which never prompted him to any undertaking.

Thus it appears that while Socrates recognized the greatness and excellence of wisdom and realized the value of prudence as one of its elements he failed to inspire it with the disposition for practical effort or action upon which Solomon had laid such stress.

Consequently, since a disposition to practical action for the benefit of others is unquestionably a part of intellectual excellence, the

conception which Socrates had of wisdom was evidently inferior to that of the Jewish king.

Plato, a disciple of Socrates and regarded as the greatest idealist of any age, held that such perfections as man may happen to possess are due to wisdom which he treated as the fruit of reason. Thus, by confining wisdom to the limits of reason he failed to give it a disposition for action which has no definite relation to reason but is a distinct qualification of the mind. He also held that all knowledge which is based on the evidence of the senses is mere opinion which in his own opinion may be true but might be false and that, therefore, all true wisdom must be reasoned out from self evident propositions. Thus he deprived wisdom of the benefit of experience. Consequently, the great idealist, by limiting wisdom to reason

and denying the evidence of the senses deprived it, in effect, of all practical significance.

Therefore, it seems clear that the conception of Solomon concerning wisdom was much superior to that of Plato.

Aristotle, a pupil of Plato and generally regarded as the greatest of ancient philosophers, held that all rational processes must be based on observation and experience and that the highest degree of intellectual excellence is founded upon virtue which must manifest itself in prudent effort or action. He thus gave to wisdom the practical features which had been withheld by the extreme prudence of Socrates and by the idealism of Plato.

Thus it would seem that the conception of wisdom reached by Aristotle was practically the same as that of Solomon.

KANT.

Immanuel Kant, probably the most profound metaphysical philosopher of modern times held that:

> "Perceptions without notions are blind and notions without perceptions are void."

But, while he thus recognized the validity of experience he stated that:

> "Wisdom is the final purpose of human reason."

He, therefore, made wisdom originate in reason, as Plato had done, and as a consequence, he did not recognize the prime significance of an adequate disposition for practical effort or action.

Accordingly, the conception which was held by Kant with respect to wisdom was evidently inferior to that of Solomon and even to that of Aristotle.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Within the last century Sir William Hamilton, the eminent Scottish metaphysician, stated his conception of intellectual excellence to be as follows:

> "Thus, in the actualities of social life, each man, instead of being solely an end to himself,—instead of being able to make everything subordinate to that full and harmonious development of his individual faculties, in which his full perfection and his true happiness consist,—is, in general, compelled to degrade himself into the mean or instrument towards the accomplishment of some end, external to himself, and for the benefit of others."

Thus it appears that in the estimation of a leading modern philosopher the systematic advancement of the general welfare of mankind is so far from being an indication of intellectual excellence that it should be regarded as evidence of mental degradation.

And within comparatively recent years

this remarkable notion concerning intellectual excellence has been indorsed by a prominent educator with the statement that:

> "The man who pursues knowledge simply because it is useful is on the same low plane as the man who follows honesty because it is the best policy."

Such opinions of intellectual excellence can be justified by neither science, philosophy nor religion. They arise, no doubt, from the natural propensity of man to believe those things which he wishes to be true and from the tendency of every one to form his opinions of practical affairs from the standpoint of his own mental aptitude. However that may be it is certain that the conceptions of Solomon and Aristotle are superior to notions of wisdom based on the last two opinions.

Coming down to the present time the leading definitions given in the standard dic-

tionaries may fairly be accepted as showing the different conceptions of wisdom now current.

According to one of these authorities wisdom is:

> "Knowledge with the capacity to make due use of it."

Now, a mind limited to knowledge with a capacity to make due use of it is manifestly inferior to one with the same knowledge and capacity but with a disposition to apply those qualities to the advancement of human welfare.

Therefore, the definition does not represent the highest degree of intellectual excellence.

By another authority wisdom is defined:

> "The power of discerning what is true and right or what is conducive to the highest interests; discernment of the real characteristics and relations of conduct."

CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF WISDOM.

Here, it will be observed, no consideration is given to a disposition for effort and, consequently, the definition is not complete.

Another standard authority defines wisdom as:

> "The power or faculty of forming the fittest and truest judgment of any matter presented for consideration; a combination of discernment, discretion, and sagacity, or similar qualities and faculties, involving also a certain amount of knowledge, especially the knowledge of men and things gained by experience."

Since this definition does not include a disposition for action it does not, for reasons already stated, express the highest degree of intellectual excellence.

According to still another authority wisdom is:

> "Knowledge united with a disposition to use it for the best purposes."

While this definition recognizes a disposition for action as an element of wisdom it is deficient because knowledge does not always include the discretion necessary for the proper adaptation of effort or action to unexpected changes in practical conditions.

Now, rejecting all conceptions and definitions that have been shown to be deficient there remain available for the establishment of an adequate definition of wisdom as the highest degree of intellectual excellence only the conceptions of Solomon and Aristotle.

Accordingly, and with proper regard for those high conceptions human wisdom is here understood to be:

> That state or condition of mind which qualifies a man in disposition and ability for the systematic advancement of human welfare.

IMPLICIT DEFINITION OF WISDOM.

It has been shown that systematic advancement of the welfare of man originates in and is determined by his own conduct; and it must be admitted that it is only through the intelligent achievement of good purposes that the systematic advancement of human welfare by the agency of man is practicable.

Therefore, wisdom, in its relation to purpose may be implicitly defined as:

> That state or condition of mind which qualifies a man in disposition and ability for the systematic achievement of good purposes.

Since wisdom involves both disposition and ability for achievement it must include intellectual efficiency which has been shown to be a proportionate and efficient combination of spirit, practical knowledge and discretion regardless of any distinctions of good and evil.

Therefore, wisdom may be regarded as intellectual efficiency united with ability to distinguish good from evil purposes and a disposition to avoid the evil and achieve the good.

That qualification which enables the mind to distinguish good from evil purposes is generally known as judgment.

This, in view of the definition given of good and evil purposes, means that:

Judgment is:

> Ability to determine whether the achievement of a purpose will be sure in the end to advance the welfare of mankind.

But it is certain that even though a man may have intellectual efficiency and a fair degree of judgment he will often achieve purposes which he must realize are inimical to the future welfare of himself and others. This is, of course, because the allurements of temp-

tation or other influences prevent their judgment from giving proper direction to the spirit of achievement which is an essential part of intellectual efficiency.

Thus it appears that between judgment and spirit there is no definite affinity.

Experience teaches that judgment can be acquired only by observation of the effect of completed purposes upon the welfare and progress of man. Consequently, it must be the result of study and thought concerning the data of knowledge and partake of the nature of discretion. But, since men achieve evil purposes against what must be their better judgment it is clear that judgment has no practical relation to either knowledge or discretion.

Therefore, judgment may be treated as a distinct intellectual qualification.

While the spirit of a man may prompt him to achieve a purpose which he knows or has reason to believe is evil it is certain that he may be depended upon not to do so with an adequate degree of that excellent qualification of mind known as:

Virtue, which is:

> A disposition to make the best use of available means for advancement of the welfare of mankind.

According to this definition a man of adequate virtue not only will endeavor to avoid all evil but he will make every effort to achieve every good purpose within the range of his opportunities and abilities.

This means that to the extent that natural or acquired spirit is subjected to the dictates of good judgment it becomes identical with virtue.

EXPLICIT DEFINITION OF WISDOM.

In view of what has been stated, The Wisdom of Man may be explicitly defined as a combination of the following intellectual qualifications:

Practical knowledge:

> That which is immediately available for achievement of the purposes of man.

Discretion:

> Ability to make efficient use of means under changing conditions of practice.

Judgment:

> Ability to distinguish good from evil purposes.

Virtue:

> Disposition to make the best and greatest use of all obtainable means for achievement of good purposes.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER XI.

DEGREES OF HUMAN WISDOM.

The satisfaction derived from intellectual exercise has led many great men to attach more importance to the mere pursuit of knowledge than to its possession or its use.

Thus, Malebranche stated that:

> "If I held truth captive in my hand, I should open my hand and let it fly, in order that I might again pursue and capture it."

This was emphasized by Lessing thus:

> "Did the Almighty, holding in his right hand **Truth** and in his left **Search after Truth,** deign to tender me the one I might prefer,—in all humility, but without hesitation, I should request **Search after Truth.**"

This sentiment seems to have culminated in the mind of Sir William Hamilton who re-

cognized it as follows:

> "Now the various opinions which prevail concerning the comparative utility of human sciences and studies, have all arisen from two errors.
>
> "The first of these consists in viewing man, not as an end **unto himself,** but merely as a mean organized for the sake of something **out of himself;** and under this partial view of human destination, those branches of knowledge obtain exclusively the name of **useful**, which tend to qualify a human being to act the lowly part of a dexterous instrument.
>
> "The second and the more dangerous of these errors, consists in regarding the cultivation of our faculties as subordinate to the acquisition of knowledge, instead of regarding the possession of knowledge as subordinate to the cultivation of our faculties."

The context shows that he limits the cultivation of the mental faculties to the pur-

suit of knowledge without regard to its practical application and contains the following quotation from Aristotle:

> "The arts and sciences are powers, but every power exists only for the sake of action; the end of philosophy, therefore, is not knowledge, but the energy conversant about knowledge."

The meaning of Aristotle is here exactly the opposite of that attributed to him by the eminent Scottish philosopher. For, the arts and sciences are powers only as sources of knowledge so that the Grecian sage meant that knowledge exists only for the sake of action or application. Moreover, energy may be conversant about knowledge not only in its acquisition but often to a greater extent in its use. Knowing this, the foremost exponent of practical action, instead of limiting philosophy to the pursuit, naturally would have extended

it to the application of knowledge. And that this is what he intended is shown by the consideration that otherwise he could not consistently have maintained that the gods, who were supposed to possess all knowledge:

> "Are happy because they are active."

Now, it is manifest that the quotation from Malebranche, in so far as it relates to wisdom as the highest degree of intellectual excellence, might be discredited by any true follower of Solomon or Aristotle with the statement that:

> Having captured truth I would not let it fly and waste my energies in taking it again; but I would hold it, apply it to the achievement of good purposes and thus promote the welfare of myself and others.

The pursuit of knowledge without any regard to its possession or its use is practically

equivalent to the working out of an amusing puzzle. This being true, the man who confines himself to such pursuits follows knowledge only to the point of practical significance and then, by stopping short, places a limitation on his wisdom. Thus it is that many learned men through their dislike for practical effort are far from being wise.

Fortunately, however, many brilliant men with a disposition to pursue knowledge without regard to its practical application not only capture it but also imprison it carefully in their writings. To this is due a great part of that immense fund of learning which, having been organized for convenient reference in the encyclopaedias and text books, is accessible to all men as a most important means for the achievement of human purposes.

Thus it appears that while a disposition for mental exercise without a practical object limits the wisdom of the individual it tends to increase the total wisdom possible to man.

Again, knowledge, in addition to its great potential value may upon occasion be made highly ornamental even though its possessor may have little or no ability for its practical application.

Wherefore, many men who aspire to wisdom confine their efforts to theoretical knowledge, believing that it alone will bring to them the highest degree of intellectual excellence. This is also true of those vainglorious men who would conceal from themselves and others their want of disposition for practical effort. Thus, knowledge, being mistaken for wisdom, discretion and judgment are neglected and

virtue is often excluded by a misguided ambition.

This pride of theoretical knowledge has always been widely prevalent and must be what led Solomon to condemn conceit, gave excessive prudence to the Daemon of Socrates and caused that remarkable tendency of the philosophers of every enlightened age to neglect the vital element of spirit or disposition for practical action in forming their conceptions of wisdom.

Discretion, being native sagacity improved and developed by thought concerning the data of knowledge, is difficult to attain. This is chiefly because it involves ability to make ready adjustments of means and methods to new and impending conditions. This ability, to any notable extent, can be acquired only by carefully preserved experience gained

through persistent application of means and this requires labor, fortitude, self denial, practical knowledge and fine discrimination of means as well as method. Since all these qualities are seldom found combined in a single person a man of large discretion is the exception rather than the rule. Thus, the difficulties of discretion constitute a serious limitation to the wisdom of every man.

The judgment of any man with respect to a given purpose depends primarily upon his ability to predict:

1. The effect upon his own present welfare.
2. The effect upon the present welfare of others.
3. The ultimate effect upon his own welfare.
4. The ultimate effect upon the welfare of others.

Now, it is certain that beyond simple purposes comparable to those manifested by some of the lower animals no man can foretell with precision even the immediate effects of an achievement. In addition to this, even were a man able to predict each particular effect of the achievement of a purpose he must predetermine the final general effect in order that his judgment might be complete and this is seldom possible except in the ordinary recurrent purposes of life.

These conditions place a serious limitation on the wisdom of every man with the result that the best he can do is to accept such rules of judgment as have been sanctioned by the experience of custom and by authority of Statute even though the propriety of many of these are regarded as problematical.

WISDOM AND VIRTUE.

Virtue is the vital quality of human wisdom. But it must be possessed exactly to the right extent. For, if it is deficient intellectual efficiency lies dormant and judgment is futile; while if it transcends the limits of judgment it is apt to defeat its purposes and bring about confusion and disaster. This delicate adjustment requires not only suitable knowledge, large discretion and good judgment but also the control of all those passions and propensities of man in which are to be found much of his weakness as well as much of his strength. Thus it seems that there is no capacity, faculty or propensity of mind that is not directly or indirectly related to the qualification of virtue.

In view of what has been stated there appears a truth which although generally well known seems to be too unwelcome to be ap-

preciated and which may be stated in general terms thus:

> No man contains within himself to any notable extent that just and proportionate combination of practical knowledge, discretion, judgment and virtue which constitutes true wisdom.

But while this is true of the human individual it is not necessarily true of a number of men taken as a whole. For, there are men of ample knowledge, others of fair discretion, some of tolerable judgment, as human judgment goes, and all of these may have some virtue. And there are certain other men of sufficient executive ability to select, classify and organize those men and cause them to co-operate in the prosecution and completion of some good and important purpose and thus display, as a whole, a notable degree of wisdom.

Were this not true then human progress would be as insignificant as the wisdom of the individual, but that it is true is shown by numerous great and good achievements which otherwise would not have been possible.

Whence two propositions must be true:

1. The wisdom of the human individual cannot be great and at its highest limit consists of executive ability and virtue combined with a judgment that recognizes its own deficiencies and defers to the best available judgments of other men.

2. The wisdom of man in general with its qualities existing in different men but properly combined by executive ability is great in proportion to the knowledge and discretion of the individuals and to the judgment and virtue of the whole.

From the explicit definition given it is evident that the wisdom of every man, by reason of its virtue, naturally prompts him to the

achievement of every good purpose within the scope of his abilities and opportunities.

Therefore, the wisdom of any man must be estimated from the nature and practical significance of the purposes which he may actually have achieved.

Accordingly, it will be assumed, as was done in treating of intellectual efficiency, that every man is free and able to obtain sufficient means for the achievement of his practicable purposes.

Under that assumption the different degrees of wisdom possessed by the human individual may be exemplified thus:

The common laborer who earns an honest living shows knowledge of his implements and of the materials upon which he uses them, discretion in their use, judgment in his honesty of purpose and virtue by his industry and per-

sistence. He, therefore, shows some wisdom which, though of small degree, is greater than is shown by him who labors not at all.

The artisan who makes a useful piece of mechanism shows knowledge of the properties of matter, discretion in their use and in the states of law and order shown in the machine, judgment in its value and utility and virtue by the conduct and completion of his purpose. This artisan displays more knowledge and discretion, better judgment, greater virtue and, therefore, a higher degree of wisdom than the common laborer.

The man of affairs who organizes artisans and laborers under rules and regulations so that all shall work together and by proper measures surely bring about an excellent result shows knowledge of men and means, discretion by the prescription and enforcement of

his rules, judgment in the nature of his purpose and virtue by its laudable achievement. Manifestly such a man displays more wisdom than is shown by any artisan or laborer working under him.

Should this man of affairs select a manager of sufficient executive ability to enforce his rules and regulations he then, in so far as he himself might be concerned, would have established a state of self-enforcing law and order to which he might entrust the ultimate accomplishment of his good and useful object. Then, should he by repetition of this process carry forward simultaneously several useful purposes he would display more wisdom than would be shown by any manager whom he might employ.

Should he select his purposes with due

regard for their relations to each other and organize them under proper regulations so that all would be carried forward and abreast and finally be merged into a single and proportionately great and good result he would show more wisdom than the man who might achieve but not consolidate those purposes.

The statesman who serves his countrymen and by precept and example increases the knowledge, enhances the discretion, improves the judgment and stimulates the virtue of the citizen in conservation of the present state, shows knowledge by his precepts, discretion by his influence, judgment by the nature of his purpose and virtue by his conduct and example. He thus prevents confusion among the purposes of many different men and makes possible a state of social law and order.

But the statesman who prevents confusion is manifestly not so wise as he who by prescription and enforcement of proper rules of order causes his countrymen to correlate all their purposes and work together for the welfare and progress of the whole.

And wiser than any other is the statesman who by appealing to experience, to sensation and to thought causes salutary rules of order to carry their own enforcement with them and thus builds up a comprehensive state of self-enforcing law and order which consolidates the wisdom of many men in the achievement of a single practical purpose of great and increasing common good.

The achievement of such a purpose is the end and aim of civilization and the perfection of civilization is recognized as the highest ideal of human wisdom.

HIGHEST DEGREE OF HUMAN WISDOM.

But perfect civilization requires a comprehensive code of salutary rules of order to each and every one of which every man must give spontaneous obedience.

From the considerations set forth, all of which are confirmed by the facts of history and by the convictions of every man of common sense, it must be true that:

> The highest possible degree of human wisdom is that which must manifest itself in the best and greatest use, through self-enforcing laws and rules of order, of all obtainable means for the achievement of a single good, great and practical purpose.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER XII.

UNLIMITED WISDOM.

The notion that the universe was created and is governed by a single supernatural Cause of absolute liberty, infinite power and unlimited wisdom is understood to be one of the greatest of human conceptions.

This conception is sublimely expressed by the Scriptural passages:

> "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."
>
> "The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth; by understanding hath he established the heavens."

To discover the practical significance of the unlimited wisdom of the Creator is a prob-

lem that has enlisted the energies of the theologians and philosophers of every enlightened age.

It seems to have been generally understood that two kinds of wisdom are no more possible than two kinds of truth and that, consequently, the unlimited wisdom of the Deity differs from the finite wisdom of man, not in kind but only in degree.

This is recognized and expressed in the Scriptures by the passage:

> "So God created man in his own image; In the image of God created he him; male and female created he them."

Therefore, the best that any man can do is to assume that the creative and governing Cause with absolute liberty and infinite power is possessed, to the highest possible degree, of all the intellectual qualifications which consti-

tute the wisdom of man and then to accept the philosophical consequences which may be developed from that basis.

Now, it has been shown that human wisdom is a combination of knowledge, discretion, judgment and virtue and that:

> The highest possible degree of human wisdom is that which must manifest itself in the best and greatest use, through self-enforcing laws and rules of order, of all obtainable means for the achievement of a single good, great and practical purpose.

Whence for reasons stated, and in so far as man is able to determine:

> The unlimited wisdom of a creative and governing Cause of absolute liberty and infinite power will manifest itself by the prosecution of a single definite purpose illimitably good and great, in the achievement of which all causes will have the greatest possible scope under a perfect state of self-enforcing Law and Order.

PRIMORDIAL PROPOSITIONS.

This being understood, there may be established by means of the explicit definition given of the Wisdom of Man the following primordial propositions:

1. Before the beginning of organized existence there must have been formed a single definite purpose illimitably good and great.

For, otherwise the virtue of the creative Cause would have been deficient and unlimited wisdom would not have been possible.

2. Causes necessary for the great purpose must either have existed in the beginning or must have been created.

For, were this not true then the virtue of the creative Cause of infinite power would have been limited.

3. The greatest possible scope must have been given to all available causes under perfect self-enforcing principles, laws and rules of order.

For otherwise, certain causes would not be subject to systematic control and an illimitable definite purpose might be impracticable.

4. In the beginning every corporeal, vital and intellectual entity must have been in the crudest possible state consistent with mere existence.

For, were this not true then all available causes would not have been given the greatest possible scope.

5. All events necessary for the illimitable definite purpose must duly and surely come to pass and no others must be possible.

For, any event less would make the total insufficient, any additional would transcend the illimitable purpose and any arbitrary act or relation would mean a defect in some principle, law or rule of order which might destroy all definite relation and bring about confusion.

PHENOMENA OF EXISTENCE.

Those five propositions, taken altogether, mean that in order that any hypothesis of a creative and governing Cause of absolute liberty, infinite power and unlimited wisdom may be sustained it must be true that:

> The dominion of self-enforcing Law and Order is absolute and unconditional.

The extent to which the hypothesis of a single Cause of unlimited wisdom accords with the observed phenomena of existence may be indicated generally thus:

The orderly progress of events and the apparent states of Law and Order that prevail among them all suggest intelligent purpose and control; the general welfare and progress of mankind indicate the purpose to be good and the tremendous and incessant action of existence denotes that it is great.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

That existence contains adequate means for achievement of a definite purpose illimitably good and great is indicated by the abundance and diversity of existing causes, by their actual and potential energies and by the manifold and marvelous, beneficial and efficient relations that are known to prevail among them all.

That every entity was, at the beginning, in the crudest possible state and that, consequently, all causes then had the greatest conceivable scope is shown in all departments of existence:

In Corporeal Existence:

By what is known to have been the original state of matter in which apparent confusion was flagrant and extreme. This naturally gave to mechanical and to chemical energies the greatest possible range of operation.

ORIGINAL CRUDITY.

In Vital Existence:

By the low forms of vitality under which plants and animals made their first appearance on the earth and by which, at the beginning, vital energies were given the widest imaginable range.

In Intellectual Existence:

By the ignorance, superstition, immorality, cruelty, injustice and general depravity which characterized the conduct of man during the early stages of his career and of which there are innumerable conspicuous instances at the present time. It is manifest that this state of mind, so productive of evil, cannot be justified except by the predominance of good purposes and by the consideration that otherwise the intellectual energies of man could not have been given their greatest and most efficient scope.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

That all existing causes and their energies are subject entirely to perfect self-enforcing Law and Order is indicated everywhere without exception:

In Corporeal Existence:

By the systematic processes through which it has been brought from chaos to its present magnificent state of progressive development by corporeal energies acting according to self-enforcing mechanical and chemical laws.

In Vital Existence:

By the gradual and orderly progress of vegetable and animal life from the lowest to the highest forms by vital energies acting under the self-enforcing laws of Natural Selection and by the marvelous relations among such forms as well as between the phenomena of organic and inorganic existence.

UNIVERSAL LAW AND ORDER.

In Intellectual Existence:

By the gradual advancement of knowledge from the lowest possible condition by intellectual energies impelled by natural causes and directed by self-enforcing laws of sensation, thought and emotion. Also, by the systematic elevation of moral and religious ideals from abject depravity through the wonderful self-enforcing, natural and ultimate predominance of the good over the evil.

In Existence Generally:

By the manifold relations among phenomena widely different in kind, which relations might not exist and apparently need not prevail did they not contribute to a perfect state of self-enforcing universal Law and Order subject to no arbitrary change and admitting of no interference. Also, by the condition that among all the countless observations

and discoveries of Philosophy and Science there is not the slightest conclusive evidence that any event has ever happened which did not come to pass in strict accordance with self-enforcing Law and Order.

Whence, it may be affirmed that:

All phenomena of existence are in full accord with the hypothesis of a single Cause of unlimited wisdom.

Therefore, Wisdom, in whatsoever substance it may inhere and to whatsoever extent it may exist, must sustain to purpose and to self-enforcing Law and Order the following general relations:

1. The greater the wisdom the greater must be the best and greatest possible purpose.

For, wisdom without a corresponding possible purpose would be unable to express its full practical significance.

RELATIONS OF WISDOM.

2. The greater the wisdom the more abundant and diverse must be the means available for systematic achievement.

For, the degree of wisdom depends upon the extent and diversity of the means it actually and successfully applies.

3. The greater the wisdom the greater must be the state of self-enforcing Law and Order which **can** be established and maintained.

For otherwise, the systematic achievement of the best and greatest purpose might fail from want of proper method.

4. The greater the wisdom the greater is the state of self-enforcing Law and Order which it **must** establish and maintain.

For wisdom, by reason of its virtue, requires the best and greatest use of all available means and this is practicable only through self-enforcing laws and rules of order.

If the All-powerful, All-wise Cause has no being then, in view of what has been stated concerning the phenomena of existence, human wisdom itself must be the effect of natural causes and it must be conceded that:

> All events must come to pass according to self-enforcing law and order.

This means that for all the causes, effects and events endurable by man as the possessor of finite wisdom and dependent entirely upon his own achievements for advancement of his welfare, two conditions must prevail:

> 1. That which can happen in the course of self-enforcing law and order will not come to pass in any other way.
>
> 2. That which can not happen in the course of self-enforcing law and order will not come to pass at all.

For, did not these conditions prevail there would be no adequate basis for the system-

atic achievement of any purpose and human wisdom would be impossible.

Again, it has been shown that under any hypothesis of a single All-powerful, All-wise creative and governing Cause:

> The dominion of self-enforcing law and order must be absolute and unconditional.

This means that for all possible causes, conditions, effects and events three propositions must be true:

> 1. That which can happen in the course of self-enforcing law and order will not come to pass in any other way.
>
> 2. That which cannot happen in the course of self-enforcing law and order cannot come to pass at all.
>
> 3. Everything that can happen in the course of self-enforcing law and order will surely come to pass.

For, were these propositions not true then

there would be no adequate basis for the systematic achievement of a single definite purpose illimitably good and great and the exercise of unlimited wisdom would be impossible. And that they are true is indicated without exception by all the phenomena of existence known and understood by man.

The magnificent state of self-enforcing Law and Order which prevails throughout the phenomena of corporeal, vital and intellectual existence not only makes human wisdom possible but gives to man the means and opportunity for continual addition to the wisdom that is in him. It thus enables man not only to sustain but also to accelerate the systematic advancement of his welfare.

In addition to this it must be admitted that it was through the contemplation and

progressive appreciation of this great state of universal law and order that man was gradually brought to the conception of a single creative and governing Cause with liberty, power and wisdom transcending all conceivable limitations; which conception in its higher practical applications under the doctrines of Christian Religion has done so much to promote the co-operation of men for general advancement of human welfare. And history indicates that without that great conception man could never have advanced through certain stages of intellectual, moral and spiritual development and that even though it does involve inconceivable causes and conditions and even though it may not be true it has contributed as much to human welfare and progress as established fact and demonstrated truth.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

GENERAL CONCLUSION.

In view of all that has been set forth concerning Purpose, Law and Order, Means and Method, Intellectual Efficiency and Wisdom it seems clear that:

Under an adequate conception of Wisdom the findings of Practical Philosophy are in substantial accord with the hypothesis of a single supernatural Cause of absolute liberty, infinite power and unlimited wisdom until that transcendental doctrine reaches the confines of conceivable existence and passes out into the Great Unknown.